Acquihires in the Technology Sector: Antitrust Scrutiny Through the Lens of Economics
CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2025
A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) leader recently raised concerns over the talent acquisition practice known as “acquihiring.” Speaking at a Concurrences Tech Antitrust Conference in January 2026, FTC Commissioner Mark Meador warned that companies buying smaller firms solely for recruiting talent may be engaging in anticompetitive behavior.
Meador’s comments, which included the phrase “buy and kill but for the skill,” highlighted the increase in “acquihires,” concerns from regulators, and questions concerning the pro- and anticompetitive aspects of the practice.
Analysis Group consultants dive into this question in a recent CPI Antitrust Chronicle article, in which they explain that “[r]egulators and scholars have raised four principal concerns. That acquihires may function as disguised ‘killer acquisitions,’ reduce incentives for startup investment, enable inefficient ‘talent hoarding,’ or create labor market power.”
The article, coauthored by Managing Principal Rebecca Kirk Fair, Principal Juliette Caminade, Manager Zsolt Udvari, and Associate Jeanne Vellard Smith, examines potential concerns raised by regulators and academics around acquihiring. The research includes consideration of “reverse acquihiring,” in which a business hires the startup’s employees and licenses its intellectual property rather than buying the company outright. Some competition watchdogs worry that “reverse acquihires” are an attempt to avoid the typical scrutiny applied to traditional acquisitions, even though they consider such deals to be, in substance, acquisitions under a different name. As such, these watchdogs suggest that these deals should be subject to similar oversight.
However, the authors note the mitigating factors that can temper such concerns. One such factor differentiating these deals from other asset acquisitions is the independence of labor movement: Research showing that acquihired employees leave their jobs at a higher rate than other workers suggests that structural changes to the labor market from acquihiring are less durable than changes to other markets, therefore limiting the potential for long-term competitive harm from acquihires compared to traditional acquisitions. Another mitigating factor is that a startup’s acquisition does not automatically signal an end to the startup’s operations. Since post-merger integration “may be neither the objective nor the outcome of the transaction,” the authors write, some concerns voiced by competition authorities may not apply. Ultimately, the authors emphasize the need to reflect on the relative risks and benefits of further regulatory oversight.
Authors
Caminade J, Kirk Fair R, Udvari Z, Vellard Smith J