Robust Economics in an Evolving Transatlantic Competition Enforcement Landscape
July 21, 2026
Political change, regulatory reform, and geopolitical uncertainty are major preoccupations for companies and their counsel navigating international mergers. These pressures were the focus of a recent GCR Live Europe event in Brussels, where competition experts, practitioners, and other stakeholders addressed the current and future landscapes of antitrust enforcement in the EU and US.
Two experienced Analysis Group competition practitioners, Managing Principal Aditi Mehta and Competition Expert Pierre Régibeau, participated in the event. Drawing on their significant experience as economists in leadership positions in US and EU agencies, Drs. Mehta and Régibeau addressed how lawyers can interpret enforcement developments without losing sight of the economic fundamentals that continue to drive outcomes.
Across the discussions, a common theme emerged: Despite changes in competition policy, robust economic analysis remains fundamental in competition law enforcement. Political priorities and institutional developments may affect timing, process, and stakeholder engagement, but they do not change the need for careful evidence, disciplined economic reasoning, and close collaboration between lawyers and economists.
Demystifying Antitrust Enforcement in the US
Dr. Mehta, a former economics director of enforcement at the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, offered a grounded perspective on the extent to which merger review in the US has and has not changed in recent years. Outside the few high-profile transactions that may have attracted political attention, Dr. Mehta emphasized that the majority of deals filed before the US agencies continue to be reviewed in a familiar way. She noted that economists at the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have continued to focus on the same economic fundamentals – that is, whether the evidence clearly indicates that a deal gives rise to competition concerns – and that the path to merger clearance in the US still depends on developing a strong economic and factual record. Political advisors may become more relevant in certain matters, particularly those involving sensitive sectors or public-facing issues, but they do not replace the role of economics.
Dr. Mehta’s panel also discussed the growing importance of state attorneys general in US merger review. States are increasingly active and better resourced, with some expanding their antitrust teams, hiring economists, using outside counsel, and collaborating with one another. Several states have also introduced filing requirements that can bring more transactions to the attention of state enforcers. As a result, parties may need to account for new, state-level requirements when filing, rather than simply focusing on those usually considered by the DOJ or FTC. For some transactions – particularly those affecting local markets, labor, health care, or industries of state-level importance – US merger planning may increasingly resemble a multi-jurisdictional exercise.
The Road Ahead for EU Antitrust Enforcement
Dr. Régibeau, former Chief Competition Economist at the European Commission, joined a panel on what comes next for EU antitrust enforcement. He addressed the frequently heard view that, by giving a greater role to structural presumptions – the idea that certain market structures inherently harm competition – the European Commission’s Draft Guidelines on exclusionary abuse of dominance might narrow the role of economists. He noted that such presumptions are at the very core of economic analysis: Economics rarely gives us certainty, presumptions are the norm. Although economic analysis may not fit neatly within a policy approach that draws a red line between “by-object” infringements and effect-based analysis, Dr. Régibeau suggested that the use of presumptions can, in fact, help focus economic analysis on the most important aspects of the case. He raised the example of pure bundling – offering a suite of products without the option of purchasing them individually. The clear conclusion of the literature is that, without clear efficiencies, such arrangements are likely to be anticompetitive. If that presumption were to be accepted, regulators could then focus on any specifics of a case that might reverse the presumption instead of spending time reexamining the bundling debate. This could allow the work of economists to be more focused and effective.
A shift toward reliance on presumptions may also change the way economists and lawyers work together. The focus of economists’ work may move away from more general, abstract analyses and toward more targeted ones designed around the questions that matter most for a specific case. In that sense, the role of the economist would not be diminished; it would become more integrated with legal strategy.
The discussion also considered vertical restraints, enforcement of interim measures, and the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy. On the topic of vertical restraints, Dr. Régibeau highlighted that part of the EU’s framework for vertical restraints enforcement – namely, the protection of online sales – is now seen by some as outdated. Although protecting online sales was a focus 10 years ago, that concern may have become obsolete as a policy priority, given that online sales are a mature part of many markets rather than an emerging channel. He argued that enforcement of vertical restraints should focus on issues that are relevant for the internal market today. Regarding interim measures, Dr. Régibeau suggested that, as invasive as they may seem, internal measures can benefit the parties under investigation by allowing the Commission to avoid rushed decisions that may be unnecessarily detrimental to the parties. In his closing remarks, Dr. Régibeau emphasized that industrial policy and competition policy are complementary, not exclusive alternatives to each other.